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Abstract This paper analyzes optimal linear and non-linear taxes on capital and la-
bor incomes in a life-cycle model of human capital investment, financial savings, and
labor supply with heterogenous individuals. A dual income tax with a positive mar-
ginal tax rate on not only labor income but also capital income is optimal. The positive
tax on capital income serves to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax on human cap-
ital accumulation. The optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is lower than that
on labor income if savings are elastic compared to investment in human capital, sub-
stitution between verifiable and non-verifiable inputs in human capital formation is
difficult, and most investments in human capital are verifiable so that education sub-
sidies can directly reduce the tax wedge on learning. Numerical calculations suggest
that the optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is substantial.
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“. . . A tax under which consumption and saving are placed on an equal footing
is superior to one, as with a general income tax, under which an extra impost
is laid on savings. [. . . ] It would be possible, if it were so desired, to make a
rough adjustment for the fact that some expenditures upon consumption are, in
effect, investments yielding income in the future, and, therefore, liable under
an ordinary income tax to a double impost. Thus charges incurred for [. . . ]
education might be exempted eo nomine.” (Pigou 1928, pp. 122–123)
1 Introduction
Should capital income be taxed? This has always been an important question in public
finance. Since Pigou (1928), many papers have shown that under certain conditions
capital income should not be taxed. However, the public finance literature has tradi-
tionally focussed either on optimal taxation of savings in dynamic models with rep-
resentative agents or on optimal labor income taxation in static models with endoge-
nous labor supply and heterogeneous agents. Reminiscent of Pigou (1928), models
with infinitely lived individuals without endogenous human capital formation typi-
cally find that a zero tax on capital income is optimal in the long run (Chamley 1986;
Judd 1985). This result also holds true in models with heterogeneous or finitely lived
agents as long as preferences are weakly separable between consumption and leisure
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976; Ordover and Phelps 1979).1 Some do also analyze hu-
man capital formation in infinitely lived representative agent models, and the typical
result is that optimal taxes on human and financial capital should be zero in finite
time (Jones et al. 1993, 1997; Judd 1999).2
This paper explores how redistributive governments should simultaneously opti-
mize taxes on financial savings, labor incomes, and human capital investments in the
presence of heterogeneous finitely lived households. As the quote by Pigou suggests,
the desirability of zero capital taxes critically relies on the possibility to expense all
costs of human capital investments at the rate of the labor tax. This paper demon-
strates that the government should optimally employ positive capital income taxes to
alleviate the distortionary impact of labor income taxes on human capital formation
if the costs of learning are not all verifiable to the government, and thus cannot all be
1The optimal zero capital tax result breaks down in models with heterogeneous agents and finite lives
when different labor types are imperfect substitutes in production (Pirttilä and Tuomala 2001).
2See Boskin (1975) and Heckman (1976) for early treatments of the effects of capital income taxes on
human capital formation. These treatments are not put in an optimal tax setting.
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expensed. Direct educational expenditures on books, computers, and traveling are im-
portant examples of non-verifiable investments in human capital. Tuition costs cannot
be deducted for income tax purposes in many countries either, so that these costs are
also effectively non-verifiable. Moreover, costs of effort while enrolled in education,
such as studying hard, sacrificing leisure activities, and preparing exams, are impor-
tant immaterial costs that the government cannot verify easily.3 Simple simulations
suggest that the optimal tax rate on capital income is substantial—even if a relatively
large part of human capital investments are verifiable, and thus can be subsidized.
Indeed, the indirect costs of education, foregone labor earnings while enrolled in ed-
ucation, are in effect deductible from labor taxation as lower labor earnings reduce
the labor tax bill.
To simultaneously analyze optimal redistributive taxes on financial saving and la-
bor income, we formulate a two-period life-cycle model of human capital formation,
financial savings, and labor supply with heterogenous agents who differ in their abil-
ities to acquire human capital. Individuals invest in human capital in the first period
of their lives. In the second period, they work, enjoy leisure, and consume all their
assets. We show that the optimal tax system features a dual-income tax with positive
marginal tax rates on both capital and labor incomes. This result applies to both linear
and non-linear tax systems.
In contrast to the earlier literature, positive capital taxes are optimal in order to
mitigate the distortionary effects of the labor tax on investments in human capital.
Whereas labor taxes encourage individuals to substitute human by financial assets,
the capital tax offsets these distortions in the composition of saving. Since capital in-
come taxes distort the overall level of saving, the optimal capital tax strikes a balance
between distorting the composition and the level of saving. Indeed, the government
faces a fundamental trade-off between efficiency in human capital formation and al-
locative efficiency in the intertemporal allocation of consumption. The optimal tax
rate on capital income is relatively large compared to the tax on labor income if ag-
gregate saving is inelastic compared to learning so that learning distortions dominate
saving distortions.
Our case for substantially positive capital income taxes relies only on the pres-
ence of positive labor income taxes and does not directly depend on the redistrib-
utive preferences of the government. Optimal labor taxes increase with stronger re-
distributional desires and capital income taxes should increase accordingly—but only
for efficiency reasons. In contrast to representative agent models (see, e.g., Atkinson
and Sandmo 1980; Nielsen and Sørensen 1997; Jones et al. 1993, 1997; and Judd
1999), we do not have to arbitrarily exclude lump-sum taxes as a policy instrument
to prevent the optimal tax problem from becoming trivial.
3Education may also generate non-pecuniary benefits, such as the fun of studying, nicer jobs, additional
status, more freedom of occupational choice, etc. These non-pecuniary benefits, however, are typically
much less important than immaterial costs in view of the observed high returns on (higher) education,
which exceed returns on safe investments and approach those on equity. Whereas these high returns can be
due to market failures, they also compensate investors for non-pecuniary costs that exceed non-pecuniary
benefits (see also Judd 2000; and, Palacios-Huerta 2006).
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Our finding that capital income needs to be taxed does not depend on non-
separable utility, heterogenous preferences, or financial market failures.4 Also, Erosa
and Gervais (2002), Golosov et al. (2006), and Diamond (2006) analyze optimal cap-
ital income taxes in life-cycle models rather than models with infinitely lived indi-
viduals, but they allow for non-separable preferences in consumption and leisure.
They demonstrate that optimal capital taxes are positive if leisure and consumption
are more complementary later in life than they are earlier in life.5 Saez (2002) and
Diamond (2006) incorporate heterogenous preferences and find that capital income
should optimally be taxed for redistributive reasons if high-ability individuals feature
a lower discount rate than low-ability individuals do.
Another strand of literature relies on incomplete financial markets to derive op-
timal capital income taxes. Aiyagari (1995) finds that positive capital income taxes
are optimal because they redistribute resources from unconstrained toward liquidity-
constrained phases in the life-cycle and from high-income states toward low-income
states of nature. Hence, a positive tax on capital income helps to complete the miss-
ing capital and insurance markets. Also, Golosov et al. (2003, 2006), and Diamond
(2006) study optimal taxation in the presence of non-insurable idiosyncratic skill
shocks. They demonstrate that a positive tax wedge on saving may help to relax in-
centive constraints.6
Our paper is also related to the literature on the optimal taxation of capital incomes
with infinitely lived households (Chamley 1986; Judd 1985, 1999; Jones et al. 1993,
1997). In particular, the government must tax income only initially, run large budget
surpluses, and build up a substantial stock of assets in initial periods so as to finance
all future spending from the returns of these assets and distortionary taxes to zero in
finite time. Indeed, if our model would be extended to an infinite horizon setting in
which the government would have full access to public debt, we also would obtain
zero optimal taxes on both labor and capital incomes in finite time. However, in more
realistic and practical settings, taxation is a fact of life at any moment in time. As long
as the government needs positive tax revenues, we show that positive capital income
taxes are optimal if labor income is taxed at positive rates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes individual be-
havior. Section 3 derives optimal linear tax policy if all educational efforts are non-
verifiable. Subsequently, Sect. 4 introduces verifiable educational efforts, which the
government can subsidize. Section 5 derives optimal non-linear tax policies. Sec-
tion 6 performs some numerical simulations. Section 7 concludes and discusses the
policy implications of the analysis. Four Appendices contain the technical details of
our analysis.
4All the papers mentioned, including our own, assume that the government can commit to announced
policies. A lack of commitment can also result in positive capital income taxes (see Kydland and Prescott
1977; and, Fischer 1980). We show that capital income taxes are optimally positive even if the government
can credibly commit to tax policies.
5In life-cycle models, Ordover and Phelps (1979) and Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) showed earlier that
the optimal capital tax is zero if leisure is weakly separable from consumption. See also Bernheim (2002)
for a more elaborate discussion.
6In a similar vein, Grochulski and Piskorski (2005), da Costa and Maestri (2007), and Anderberg (2009)
show that tax wedges on savings or wealth are optimal in risky environments with endogenous human
capital formation.
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2 The model
2.1 Preferences and technologies
We consider a partial equilibrium two-period life-cycle model without uncertainty.
Before-tax wage rates and interest rates are exogenously fixed.7 The mass of agents
is normalized to one. In the first period, agents supply unskilled labor and devote
resources to learning. In the second period, agents supply skilled labor and spend
time on leisure, which can be interpreted as early retirement. Perfect capital markets
allow individuals to freely transfer resources across both periods.8
Individuals are heterogeneous in exogenous ability n. The cumulative distribution
of ability is F(n). f (n) is the corresponding density function with support [n,n],
n,n > 0. The government knows the distribution of abilities, but does not observe
individual ability. Accordingly, it cannot levy individual-specific lump-sum taxes to
redistribute incomes, but must rely on distortionary taxes instead.
In the first period of their lives, individuals invest peen in education, where pe rep-
resents the unit costs of education en. Initially, we assume that the government cannot
observe any of these educational investments so that it cannot subsidize them. Edu-
cational investment therefore consists only of direct expenditures and (monetized)
effort costs. Section 4 shows that our main results continue to hold if verifiable costs
of education are allowed for, such as tax-deductible foregone earnings, as long as
some non-verifiable costs remain.
Ability n can be viewed as the productivity of education, so that more able indi-
viduals produce more human capital with the same educational effort. The production
function for human capital features a constant elasticity:
hn = nφ(en) ≡ neβn , (1)
where hn denotes human capital of agent n. Human capital accumulation exhibits
decreasing returns with respect to educational effort en (i.e., β < 1). Ability and
educational investments are complementary inputs in producing human capital (i.e.,
∂2hn
∂en∂n
= βeβ−1n ≥ 0).
In the second period, human capital is supplied to the labor market in the form of
skilled labor. Gross labor income zn is the product of the number of efficiency units
of human capital, hn, and hours worked ln, i.e., zn ≡ hnln = nφ(en)ln. Furthermore,
individuals consume their net labor earnings plus the net returns on their assets (which
can be negative if individuals repay their debts).
7The model can thus be viewed as a model of a small open economy in which the international capital
market fixes the real interest rate. Endogenous factor prices determined in general equilibrium in a closed
economy do not affect the characterization of optimal tax rules derived below if labor types are perfect sub-
stitutes in production and production displays constant returns to scale (see Diamond and Mirrlees 1971).
If labor types are imperfect substitutes, however, Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) show that the production
efficiency theorem fails and capital income is optimally taxed or subsidized.
8Cameron and Heckman (2001) and Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue that liquidity constraints are
only of minor importance empirically.
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Individuals feature a common, concave, and twice differentiable utility function
defined over consumption in the first period c1n , leisure n ≡ 1 − ln, and consumption
in the second period c2n:
u
(
v
(
c1n, c
2
n
)
, n
)
, (2)
where uc1uc2 , u > 0, and uc1c1 , uc2c2 , u ≤ 0. The sub-utility function v(c1n, c2n) is
homothetic and weakly separable from leisure n. With this particular utility func-
tion, the optimal capital income tax would be zero in the absence of human capital
formation (see Bernheim 2002). This specification thus most clearly shows how en-
dogenous human capital formation affects the optimal capital income tax.
2.2 Budget constraints
The first-period budget constraint is given by
c1n + peen = ao − an, (3)
where ao is the common level of initial wealth.9
In the second period, individuals consume, work and consume their assets, or re-
pay their debts. Hence, with linear taxes, the second-period budget constraint amounts
to10
c2n = (1 − t)lnnφ(en) + Ran + g, (4)
where R ≡ 1+ (1− τ)r is the discount factor, r stands for the exogenous real interest
rate, and τ denotes the tax rate on capital income. The lump-sum transfer g and the
marginal tax rate t characterize the linear labor tax.
We arrive at the life-time budget constraint by substituting the first-period budget
constraint (i.e. (3)) into the second-period budget constraint (4) to eliminate an:
Rc1n + c2n = (1 − t)lnnφ(en) − Rpeen + Rao + g. (5)
2.3 Individual optimization
Individuals maximize their utilities by choosing c1n, c2n, n, and en, subject to their
life-time budget constraints, and taking the policy instruments of the government
as given. The resulting first-order condition for the optimal choice of education en
amounts to
(1 − t)lnnφ′(en) = pe
(
1 + (1 − τ)r) = peR. (6)
9We abstract from heterogeneity in the initial level of wealth to eliminate distributional reasons for taxing
saving so as to focus on the efficiency-enhancing properties of capital income taxation. High-ability agents
feature the lowest life-time savings, because they borrow more than low-ability agents to finance their
education in the first period. Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) include a third period to allow for the possibility
that high-ability agents save more than low-ability agents do. They show that the main results do not rely
on any particular relationship of financial savings with ability.
10Section 5 models non-linear taxation and modifies the budget constraints accordingly.
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Marginal benefits of education (the left-hand side) should equal marginal costs (the
right-hand side). The labor tax harms learning by depressing marginal benefits (since
φ′′(en) < 0). The capital income tax, in contrast, boosts education because it raises
the present value of investments in human capital by reducing the rate of return on al-
ternative investments R. Indeed, capital income taxes induce individuals to substitute
human capital for financial savings in their portfolio of human and financial assets.
The first-order condition for en (6) and the production function of human capital
(1) imply that gross labor income zn is proportional to en:
zn = lnnφ(en) = peR
(1 − t)β en. (7)
The proportionality factor peR/((1 − t)β) does not depend on ability n and is thus
the same for all agents.
The first-order condition for labor supply amounts to
u
uvvc2
= wn ≡ (1 − t)nφ(en), (8)
while the Euler equation for savings is
vc1
vc2
= 1 + (1 − τ)r = R. (9)
The second-order condition for utility maximization implies11
μn ≡ 1 − β(1 + n) > 0, n ≡ ∂ln
∂wn
wn
ln
, (10)
where n denotes the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply with respect to the
after-tax wage wn ≡ (1 − t)nφ(en). In view of a positive feedback between human
capital and labor supply, decreasing returns in human capital accumulation (β < 1)
are not sufficient for the second-order condition to be met. In particular, more learning
raises the wage rate. The associated substitution effect boosts labor supply, which in
turn makes learning more attractive. In order to prevent corner solutions, decreasing
returns in the production of human capital must offset this positive feedback effect.
Substituting the link between en and zn (7) into the life-time budget constraint (5),
we find that the discounted value of life-time consumption Rc1n + c2n is linear in gross
income (and in view of (7) also linear in learning):
Rc1n + c2n = (1 − β)(1 − t)zn + Rao + g. (11)
Weak separability between leisure and consumption in utility and homotheticity of
v(c1n, c
2
n) ensure that the shares of first- and second-period consumption in after-tax
labor income do not depend on ability n, i.e.,
1 − ω ≡ Rc
1
n
(1 − β)(1 − t)lnnφ(en) + Rao + g , (12)
11The derivation is provided in an appendix downloadable from www.xs4all.nl/~jacobs73.
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ω ≡ c
2
n
(1 − β)(1 − t)lnnφ(en) + Rao + g . (13)
For later reference, we define indirect utility uˆ(.) as
uˆ(g, t,R,n) ≡ u(v(cˆ1n, cˆ2n
)
, ˆn
)
, (14)
where hats denote the optimized values for consumption in both periods and leisure.
2.4 Government
The government maximizes a social welfare function Γ defined over individuals’
indirect utilities υ(g, t,R,n):
Γ ≡
∫ n
n
Ψ
(
uˆ(g, t,R,n)
)
dF(n), (15)
where Ψ ′(.) > 0, and Ψ ′′(.) ≤ 0. With Ψ ′(.) = 1, the social welfare function is utili-
tarian.
The government taxes labor at rate t and capital incomes at rate τ to finance exoge-
nously given public spending Λ and the endogenous uniform lump-sum transfer g.
The fundamental informational assumptions are that the government must be able
to verify aggregate labor incomes
∫ n
n
lnnφ(en) dF (n) and aggregate capital incomes
∫ n
n
ran dF (n).
The government can freely borrow and lend at the capital market at rate r . By using
the definition for R ≡ 1 + r(1 − τ), and the first-period household budget constraint,
we can express the government budget constraint in terms of t and R as12
∫ n
n
[
t lnnφ(en) + (1 + r − R)
(
ao − c1n − peen
) − g − Λ]dF(n) = 0. (16)
3 Optimal linear taxation with non-verifiable learning
The Lagrangian L for maximizing social welfare is given by
max{g,t,R} L =
∫ n
n
Ψ
(
uˆ(g, t,R,n)
)
dF(n)
+ η
∫ n
n
[
t lnnφ(en) + (1 + r − R)
(
ao − c1n − peen
) − g − Λ]dF(n),
(17)
12As in Nielsen and Sørensen (1997), one can interpret our model as the steady state of an overlapping-
generations economy where optimal taxes are equivalent to the optimal taxes of a Pareto efficient tax
reform where the government insulates the existing generations from the transition by employing public-
debt policy.
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where η represents the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint.
In order to characterize the first-order conditions, we denote the overall tax wedge
on human capital investment by
Δ ≡ tnlnφ
′(en)
pe
− τr = t
1 − t R − τr, (18)
where the second equality is derived by using the first-order condition for learning (6).
Whereas the labor tax implies an additional tax on learning, a positive capital tax
gives rise to a subsidy on education by raising the present value of the marginal
benefits of learning.
The first-order conditions for maximizing social welfare are given by
∂L
∂g
=
∫ n
n
[
(Ψ ′λn − η) + ηtnφ(en)∂ln
∂g
+ ηΔpe ∂en
∂g
− ητr ∂c
1
n
∂g
]
dF(n) = 0, (19)
∂L
∂t
=
∫ n
n
[
−(Ψ ′λn − η)zn + ηtnφ(en)∂ln
∂t
+ ηΔpe ∂en
∂t
− ητr ∂c
1
n
∂t
]
dF(n) = 0,
(20)
∂L
∂R
=
∫ n
n
[
(Ψ ′λn − η)an + ηtnφ(en)∂ln
∂R
+ ηΔpe ∂en
∂R
− ητr ∂c
1
n
∂R
]
dF(n) = 0,
(21)
where we have employed Roy’s lemma in all equations.
We follow Diamond (1975) and define the net social marginal value of income of
an individual with ability n, including the income effects on the tax base, as
bn ≡ Ψ
′λn
η
+ Δpe ∂en
∂g
+ tnφ(en)∂ln
∂g
− τr ∂c
1
n
∂g
. (22)
Hence, the first-order condition (19) implies that the average social marginal benefit
equals the unit marginal cost of a higher g:
∫ n
n
bn dF (n) = 1. (23)
The first-order conditions yield the following relationship between the optimal
distortions on human capital investment and saving (see Appendix B):
Δβ = τr(1 − ω)(1 − β + γ¯ )σ, (24)
where σ ≡ d ln(c2n/c1n)/d ln(uc1/uc2) represents the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption and γn ≡ (Rao + g)/(1 − t)zn. A bar denotes an
income-weighted average of a skill-specific variable, e.g., γ ≡ [∫ n
n
γnzn dF (n)] ×
[∫ n
n
zn dF (n)]−1.
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This expression clearly shows the role of the capital income tax in reducing the tax
distortions on learning caused by the labor income tax. The optimal capital income
tax is zero if human capital formation is not distorted by the labor tax (i.e., t = 0
so that Δ = −τr). The government optimally employs positive capital income taxes
only if learning is endogenous (β > 0) and positive labor taxes distort learning (i.e.,
if t > 0, and thus Δ > 0). Intuitively, by raising the net present value of investments
in human capital, a positive capital income tax alleviates the tax distortions imposed
by the labor income tax, as indicated by the left-hand side of (24). At the same time, a
capital income tax distorts the intertemporal allocation of consumption, as indicated
by the right-hand side of (24). At small capital income taxes, the welfare costs of
distorted saving behavior are only second order, while the welfare benefits of lower-
ing the tax distortions on learning are first order. Hence, the introduction of a small
capital income tax enhances welfare. At the optimal capital tax, the marginal welfare
benefits of alleviating the learning distortions balance the marginal welfare costs in
terms of a distorted intertemporal allocation of consumption. The optimal capital tax
thus trades off efficiency in the composition of saving (i.e., a level playing field be-
tween financial and human capital) and efficiency in the level of saving. Whereas the
intertemporal substitution elasticity σ impacts the welfare losses of capital taxes on
the level of saving, the learning elasticity β determines the welfare gains of capital
taxes on the composition of saving.
Using Δ = tR/(1 − t) − τr , we find the optimal dual-income tax structure of
capital and labor taxes from (24):
τr
1 + (1 − τ)r = (1 − δ)
t
1 − t , δ ≡
(1 − β + γ¯ )(1 − ω)σ
β + (1 − β + γ¯ )(1 − ω)σ , (25)
where 0 < δ < 1. The capital tax is large compared to the labor tax if saving is in-
elastic (small σ ) compared to learning (large β). In that case, labor taxes cause large
distortions on human capital investment, while capital taxes do not distort saving
much. Hence, capital taxes are an attractive instrument to fight labor-tax distortions
on learning. δ measures the extent to which capital taxes leave the labor-tax distor-
tion on human capital accumulation intact. If capital taxes are very distortionary (i.e.,
a large σ ), capital taxes should optimally be lower. With infinite intertemporal sub-
stitution (σ = ∞), capital taxes are zero and the full learning distortion remains, i.e.,
δ = 1. In contrast, if capital taxes are not distortionary at all (σ = 0), the capital tax
optimally eliminates the entire labor-tax distortion on learning (i.e., Δ = 0) so that
δ = 0.
In order to facilitate the discussion of the optimal tax schedules, we define the
distributional characteristic ξ of labor income as
ξ ≡
∫ n
n
(1 − bn)zn dF (n)
∫ n
n
zndF (n)
∫ n
n
bn dF (n)
> 0. (26)
ξ is the (negative) normalized covariance between the social value the government
attaches to the income of a particular ability bn and to gross second-period labor
income zn (see also Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). ξ represents the marginal distribu-
tional benefits, measured in monetary units, of redistributing a marginal euro through
Human capital and optimal positive taxation of capital income 461
the income tax. With a positive distributional characteristic ξ , the base of the labor tax
is larger for high-ability agents (who feature relatively low welfare weights) than for
low-ability agents (who feature relatively high welfare weights), so that taxing labor
income yields distributional benefits. The magnitude of the distributional character-
istic depends not only on the correlation between ability and the tax base, but also on
the correlation between ability and the welfare weights. Indeed, a zero distributional
characteristic implies either that the government is not interested in redistribution (so
that the welfare weight bn is the same for all n) or that all ability types feature the
same labor income (taxable income is the same for all n).
By using the distributional characteristic, we find the following expression for the
optimal tax on labor income (see Appendix B):13
t
1 − t =
ξ
(ω + (1 − ω)δ)[/μ] + δβ[(1 + )/μ] . (27)
This expression illustrates the fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency.
The numerator of (27) represents the distributional benefits associated with the la-
bor tax. If redistributional concerns become more important (as indicated by a larger
distributional characteristic ξ ), the optimal marginal tax rate rises (ceteris paribus
the income-weighted elasticities). The welfare losses of a higher labor-tax rate are
captured by the denominator of (27), which measures the total elasticity of the labor-
tax base. Welfare losses arise because labor taxes distort labor supply (i.e., the first
term in the denominator, where [/μ] represents the weighted compensated elastic-
ity of labor supply with respect to the tax rate) and human capital investment (i.e.,
the second term in the denominator, where β[(1 + )/μ] stands for the weighted
compensated elasticity of human capital accumulation with respect to the tax rate).
If large compensated elasticities (in absolute value) indicate that redistributive taxes
substantially distort labor supply and human capital accumulation, positive marginal
taxes are costly, and the optimal marginal labor tax is low (ceteris paribus the distri-
butional characteristic ξ ).
By combining (25) and (27), we observe that the capital tax is directly related to
the distributional characteristic of labor income rather than capital income. Indeed,
the optimal capital tax is targeted only at alleviating learning distortions and is used
neither for redistributional reasons nor to cut tax distortions on labor supply. With
weakly separable and homothetic preferences and a constant elasticity in education,
saving is proportional to labor income. Hence, a tax on saving in fact acts as a tax on
additional labor earnings. A capital tax therefore gives rise to the same labor-supply
distortions and the same distributional benefits as a labor-income tax, but introduces
additional intertemporal distortions, which can be avoided by taxing labor rather than
capital income.
The overall tax wedge on labor supply is t/(1 − t) − (1 − ω)τr/R. The term
(1 − ω)τr/R features negatively in this tax wedge because the capital tax acts as an
implicit subsidy on labor supply. The total tax wedge on labor supply can be written
13These expressions are not closed-form solutions because the elasticities (n and μn), the variables γn,
and the distributional characteristic ξ are endogenously determined.
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as (see Appendix B)
t
1 − t −
(1 − ω)τr
1 + (1 − τ)r =
ξ
[/μ] + δ
δ(1−ω)+ωβ[(1 + )/μ]
. (28)
The optimal overall tax wedge on labor supply (28) is lower if behavior becomes
more sensitive to taxes, ceteris paribus the distributional characteristic. A higher
wage elasticity of labor supply n or human capital elasticity β reduces the opti-
mal labor tax and, therefore, the need for capital taxes to mitigate the distortions of
the labor tax on learning. By boosting the efficiency costs of the capital tax, a higher
intertemporal substitution elasticity σ decreases the optimal labor-supply wedge, as
the optimal capital tax can correct for only a small part of the labor-tax distortions on
learning (so that δ and 0 ≤ δ/(δ(1 − ω) + ω) ≤ 1 are large).
The impact of the behavioral margins can be illustrated with some special cases.
Exogenous learning (β = 0) implies a zero optimal capital income tax (τ = 0). This is
a familiar result from the standard model of optimal linear labor taxation with weakly
separable utility (2), which is homothetic in consumption (see, e.g., Bernheim 2002).
The optimal linear labor tax is then (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980)
t
1 − t =
ξ
¯
. (29)
In the absence of intertemporal substitution in consumption (i.e., σ = 0), the cap-
ital income tax can accomplish efficient learning at zero cost (i.e., δ = Δ = 0 and
t/(1 − t) = τr/R). In this case, the optimal overall tax wedge is given by
t
1 − t −
(1 − ω)τr
1 + (1 − τ)r = ω
t
1 − t =
ξ
[/μ] . (30)
Although investment in human capital and financial saving are not distorted, tax rates
remain finite because the labor tax continues to distort labor supply. Endogenous
learning raises the effective elasticity of the tax base only by increasing the absolute
value of the effective elasticity of labor supply [/μ], because the learning elasticity
β[1 + /μ] drops out of the denominator of (30) (compare (30) with (28)).
With infinite intertemporal substitution in consumption (i.e., σ → ∞ so that
δ = 1), in contrast, the capital income tax is absent (i.e., τ = 0) and the entire learning
elasticity adds to the elasticity of the labor-tax base so that the optimal tax wedge on
labor supply amounts to (see also Bovenberg and Jacobs 2005)
t
1 − t =
ξ
[/μ] + β[(1 + )/μ] . (31)
Exogenous labor supply (n = 0) does not directly affect the optimal tax structure
(25) but only raises overall tax levels. The case for taxing capital income thus depends
on endogenous learning (β > 0) rather than on endogenous labor supply. The overall
tax wedge on labor supply,
t
1 − t −
(1 − ω)τr
1 + (1 − τ)r =
ξ(1 − β)
δβ
δ(1−ω)+ω
, (32)
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remains finite because the labor tax causes learning distortions that cannot be com-
pletely offset by the capital tax (if σ > 0, and thus δ > 0).
4 Optimal linear taxation with partly verifiable learning
The previous section assumed that all investments in human capital were not verifi-
able. Hence, the government could not directly subsidize learning and the government
had to rely on the capital income tax to alleviate the distortions of the labor-income
tax on human capital formation. This section explores how verifiable educational
investments, which can be subsidized by the government, affect our results. Time in-
vested in education is arguably the most important verifiable investment in human
capital, since foregone earnings are tax deductible and enrollment in (higher) educa-
tion is widely subsidized across the Western world.
With verifiable learning, the government has two instruments at its disposal to
offset the labor-tax distortion on human capital accumulation: education subsidies
and capital income taxes. This raises the question whether the government still wants
to employ capital income taxes to alleviate the labor-tax distortions on human capital.
To answer this question, let educational efforts en consist of both a verifiable part
xn and a non-verifiable part yn. xn can be interpreted as the years spent in formal
education and as foregone labor time invested in human capital. yn can be viewed
as direct costs and (monetized) effort costs. We assume that the verifiable input xn
is already tax deductible, while after-tax expenditures are subsidized at rate s so that
the marginal cost of investing xn amounts to (1 − t)(1 − s)px .
xn and yn produce aggregate investment in human capital en through a constant-
returns-to-scale sub-production function ψ :
en ≡ ψ(xn, yn), (33)
where ψx,ψy > 0, ψxx,ψyy ≤ 0 and ψxy ≥ 0. The intertemporal budget constraint
of households is now given by
Rc1n + c2n = (1 − t)lnnφ
(
ψ(xn, yn)
) − R((1 − t)(1 − s)pxxn + pyyn
) + Rao + g,
(34)
where px and py denote the exogenous prices of xn and yn, respectively. px can be
interpreted as foregone unskilled labor earnings when learning.
The first-order conditions for the choice of the two educational inputs xn and yn
amount to
lnnφ
′(.)ψx(xn, yn) = R(1 − s)px, (35)
(1 − t)lnnφ′(.)ψy(xn, yn) = Rpy. (36)
The tax rate t does not enter (35) because tax deductibility of xn implies that the
tax rate reduces equally the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of verifiable
learning xn. In contrast, the tax rate leaves the costs of non-verifiable investments yn
unaffected and depresses only the benefits of these investments (see (36)). The invest-
ment subsidy s decreases the costs of verifiable investments xn. A capital income tax
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τ > 0 reduces the costs of verifiable and non-verifiable learning alike by decreasing
the opportunity return R.
When maximizing social welfare, the government faces the following budget con-
straint:
∫ n
n
[
t
(
nlnφ(en) − (1 − s)pxxn(1 + r)
)
+ (1 + r − R)(ao − c1n − (1 − t)(1 − s)pxxn − pyyn
)]
dF(n)
=
∫ n
n
[
(1 + r)spxxn + g + Λ
]
dF(n). (37)
Appendix B sets up the maximization program and finds that the optimal education
subsidy satisfies
s + τr1+(1−τ)r
(1 − s)(1 − t) =
(
(1 − α)(1 − ρ)
1 − (1 − α)(1 − ρ)
)
Δ
R
, (38)
where ρ ≡ d ln(xn/yn)/d ln(ψy/ψx) stands for the elasticity of substitution between
xn and yn in the composite of aggregate investment in human capital en (33), and
α ≡ xnψx/ψ , is the constant share of verifiable inputs in the production of human
capital.
To interpret this expression, we note that a positive total subsidy on verifiable in-
vestments in human capital, s + τr/R, reduces the distortionary effect of the labor
tax (t > 0) on aggregate investment in human capital. At the same time, however,
it exacerbates the labor-tax distortions on the composition of learning. In particular,
the labor-tax system boosts the demand for xn at the expense of yn because only xn
is tax deductible. An education subsidy results in even more substitution away from
yn towards the tax deductible and subsidized inputs xn. The sign of the optimal ed-
ucation subsidy thus depends on the relative impact of the subsidy on the level and
composition of human capital investment. With a Leontief production function of hu-
man capital (ρ = 0), a positive subsidy on verifiable investments does not distort the
composition of learning. Hence, the government can completely offset the tax distor-
tions on non-verifiable learning yn by subsidizing verifiable inputs xn. If individuals
cannot easily substitute yn for xn (i.e., ρ < 1), xn is subsidized rather than taxed (i.e.,
s + τr/R > 0) in order to alleviate the distortionary effect of the labor tax on ag-
gregate learning. A large substitution elasticity (ρ > 1), in contrast, implies that tax
distortions on the composition of learning dominate tax distortions on the aggregate
level of learning. Hence, tax-deductible investments should be taxed so as to combat
substitution between the two educational inputs on account of the tax deductibility
of verifiable inputs. In the extreme case of infinite substitution (i.e., ρ → ∞), edu-
cation subsidies do not reduce the learning distortion compared to the case in which
all inputs are non-verifiable. Indeed, the government then finds it optimal to tax xn
(i.e., s + τr/R < 0) so as make xn effectively non-tax deductible. This ensures a level
playing field with yn.
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With optimal education policies, Appendix B finds the following relationship be-
tween the optimal capital tax and the learning distortion Δ:
Δϕβ = τr(1 − ω)(1 − β + γ¯ )σ, ϕ ≡ ρ(1 − α)
α + ρ(1 − α), (39)
where 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 measures the extent to which education subsidies leave the edu-
cation distortion intact. Except for the presence of ϕ, this expression is identical to
the corresponding expression (24) for the case without verifiable learning. Capital
income taxes are smaller (larger) if education subsidies are more (less) powerful in
alleviating learning distortions, i.e., if ϕ is small (large). Education subsidies largely
eliminate the learning distortions if the share of non-verifiable learning in aggregate
learning (1 − α) and the substitution elasticity between verifiable and non-verifiable
learning ρ are small.
We find the following expressions for the optimal dual-income tax structure (see
Appendix B):
τr
1 + (1 − τ)r = (1 − δ
∗) t
1 − t , δ
∗ ≡ (1 − β + γ¯ )(1 − ω)σ
ϕβ + (1 − β + γ¯ )(1 − ω)σ , (40)
t
1 − t =
ξ
(δ∗(1 − ω) + ω)[/μ] + δ∗ϕβ[(1 + )/μ] , (41)
t
1 − t −
τr(1 − ω)
1 + (1 − τ)r =
ξ
[/μ] + δ∗
(δ∗(1−ω)+ω)ϕβ[(1 + )/μ]
, (42)
where 0 ≤ δ∗ ≤ 1 is the slightly modified equivalent of δ. Compared to the case with-
out verifiable learning, subsidized verifiable learning in effect reduces the elasticity
of human capital investment with respect to the tax rate from δβ to δ∗ϕβ (compare
(40) with (25), (41) with (27), and (42) with (28)). Optimal capital taxes remain pos-
itive (τ > 0). The only two exceptions are the cases in which either all learning is
verifiable (α = 1) or education subsidies do not distort the composition of learning
(ρ = 0). Education subsidies then eliminate the entire labor-tax distortion on human
capital accumulation without any cost (ϕ = 0, and δ∗ = 1) so that capital income
taxes are not needed anymore.
The insights from Sect. 3 remain valid, except that verifiable learning introduces
an additional behavioral margin: substitution between verifiable and non-verifiable
learning. Both capital taxes and education subsidies are imperfect instruments for
alleviating the learning distortions imposed by labor taxes. Whereas education sub-
sidies distort the composition of learning, the capital income tax distorts aggregate
saving. Just as the other behavioral margins, more elastic behavior on account of a
higher substitution elasticity ρ reduces the optimal overall tax wedge (42). Moreover,
just as the aggregate learning and saving margin, the learning composition margin
affects the composition of the tax burden (40). At the optimum, the government bal-
ances distortions on aggregate learning with those on the composition of learning and
the intertemporal allocation of consumption. The capital tax becomes a more impor-
tant instrument for fighting the labor-tax distortions on learning if a high elasticity ρ
makes the educational subsidy a relatively weak instrument for this purpose.
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5 Optimal non-linear taxation with non-verifiable learning
This section introduces non-linear policy instruments in the model of Sect. 2 with
non-verifiable learning to check the whether our previous results depend on the linear-
ity of the policy instruments. The crucial informational requirements for non-linear
instruments are that the government can verify labor earnings zn and savings an at
the individual level. In particular, the government levies a non-linear labor-income
tax Tz(zn) and a non-linear capital-income tax Ta(ran), where marginal tax rates
are denoted by T ′z(zn) ≡ dT (zn)/dzn and T ′a(ran) ≡ dTa(ran)/d(ran). The first-
period budget constraint (3) is unaffected, but the second-period household budget
constraint (4) now becomes
c2n = zn − Tz(zn) + (1 + r)an − Ta(ran). (43)
Furthermore, in the presence of non-linear tax instruments, we no longer have to
assume that the production function for human capital hn = nφ(en) exhibits a con-
stant elasticity, and we impose only φ′ > 0, and φ′′ < 0. Hence, the learning elasticity
βn ≡ φ′(en)en/φ(en) may depend on skill n.
The first-order conditions for individual optimization are given by
u
uvvc2
= wn ≡ (1 − T ′z)nφ(en), (44)
vc1
vc2
= Rn, (45)
(1 − T ′z)lnnφ′(en) = peRn, (46)
where the interest factor Rn ≡ 1 + (1 − T ′a)r is no longer necessarily uniform across
households.
We can write the incentive compatibility constraints for this non-linear tax prob-
lem as a differential equation on utility (see also Mirrlees 1971):14
dun
dn
= u
(
v
(
c1n, c
2
n
)
,1 − ln
) ln
n
. (47)
The economy’s resource constraint amounts to
∫ n
n
(
lnnφ(en) − (1 + r)peen − (1 + r)c1n − c2n + (1 + r)ao
)
dF(n) = Λ. (48)
We solve the optimal allocation by applying the maximum principle and setting
up a Hamiltonian H, with labor supply ln and savings an as control variables, utility
un as state variable, and θn as the co-state variable for the incentive compatibility
14In adopting this approach, we assume that the second-order conditions for the optimal policy problem
are met. This requires single crossing of the utility function.
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constraints (47):
max{ln,an,un}
H ≡ Ψ (un)f (n) + η
(
lnnφ(en) + (1 + r)an − c2n
)
f (n)
− θn
n
u
(
v
(
ao − an − peen, c2n
)
,1 − ln
)
ln, (49)
where we substituted the first-period household-budget constraint (3) to eliminate c1n.
η is the shadow value of the resource constraint. Note that θn is defined negatively.
The transversality conditions are given by
lim
n→n θn = 0, limn→n θn = 0. (50)
Having determined the second-best allocation, we implement it as a decentralized
market outcome by employing non-linear taxes on labor income Tz(.) and capital
income Ta(.). The relationship between optimal marginal capital and labor taxes is
identical to the corresponding expression (25) derived under linear policies, except
that non-linear tax rates replace the linear ones, and individual elasticities replace
aggregate elasticities (see Appendix C):
rT ′a(ran)
1 + (1 − T ′a(ran))r
= T
′
z(zn)
1 − T ′z(zn)
(1 − δn), δn ≡ (1 − ω)(1 − βn + γn)σ
βn + (1 − ω)(1 − βn + γn)σ .
(51)
The intuition for the expression is the same as for the case with linear tax instruments.
A positive capital tax relaxes incentive compatibility constraints in the presence of a
positive marginal labor tax. High-ability types can mimic low-ability types by in-
vesting less in human capital. Consequently, mimickers save more in the first period
of their life cycle than non-mimickers do. By taxing saving at the margin, the gov-
ernment reduces the attractiveness for high-ability individuals to mimic low-ability
individuals. Hence, this policy relaxes the incentive compatibility constraints that are
associated with the redistribution of income.
As in the case with linear taxes, distributional concerns do not directly affect the
optimal capital tax. Indeed, the distributional term θn is absent in (51). The capital
tax is aimed exclusively at alleviating the learning distortions imposed by the labor
tax and is thus directly related to the presence of the labor tax. Accordingly, the
shape of the non-linear capital tax closely follows the pattern of marginal tax rates
on labor incomes. In particular, marginal capital taxes should be relatively large for
those individuals who face relatively large marginal labor taxes, and vice versa.
The optimal non-linear income tax is given by (see Appendix C)
T ′z(zn)
1 − T ′z(zn)
=
(1 + 1
∗n
) n
μn
nf (n)
uc2θn/η
[(ω + (1 − ω)δn)n/μn + δnβn(1 + n)/μn] , (52)
where ∗n ≡ −(lnu/u − lnuv/uv)−1 > 0 and uc2 ≡ uvvc2 . The formula is similar
to Mirrlees (1971) and consists of four elements. The first is the term in square brack-
ets. This is the elasticity of the non-linear income tax base with respect to the labor
tax and is the same as the elasticity of the tax base of the linear income tax (except
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that individual elasticities replace aggregate elasticities); see (27) and the discussion
therein. In particular, a large optimal non-linear capital tax mitigates the learning
distortion, and thus reduces δn below unity, thereby allowing for larger marginal la-
bor taxes (ceteris paribus). The second element is the elasticity (1 + ∗−1n )n/μn.
This elasticity transforms the base for learning ability nf (n) into the labor-tax
base znq(zn), where q(zn) is the density of earnings at zn (see also Saez 2001;
Bovenberg and Jacobs 2005). A larger elasticity (1 + ∗−1n )n/μn implies that, for
a given ability distribution f (n), the distribution of gross earnings q(zn) is more un-
equal. Consequently, the marginal value of redistribution increases and marginal tax
rates should be set at higher levels. The third element is nf (n). A large number of
individuals f (n) with ability n yield relatively large efficiency costs of marginal tax
rates T ′z(zn), and thus reduce the optimal marginal tax rates at ability level n.
The final element in (52) is θn/η. This term is the non-linear counterpart of ξ and
stands for the benefits of redistribution at skill n. Using the first-order condition for
un, θn/η can be written as (see Appendix C)
θn
η
=
∫ n¯
n
(
1
uc2
− Ψ
′(.)
η
)
exp
[∫ m
n
lsuv
suv
ds
]
f (m)dm. (53)
This term is well known from the optimal tax literature. It measures the welfare gain
from redistributing income from individuals with an ability level higher than n to
individuals with a lower ability than n. The transversality conditions imply that mar-
ginal benefits of redistribution are zero at the top and the bottom if bunching is absent
at the bottom and the skill distribution has a finite top. We refer the reader to Mir-
rlees (1971), Seade (1977), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Diamond (1998), and Saez
(2001) for a more elaborate discussion of this term.
6 Simulations
This section conducts a back-of-the-envelope calculation of optimal capital income
taxes by using expression (40) for the optimal dual-income tax structure. We assume
that governments optimized the labor tax (t) according to (41). We present two sim-
ulations. One is based on normal assumptions regarding the parameters (‘baseline’).
The other simulation is based on conservative parameters that would undermine our
case for positive capital taxes (‘conservative’).
Expression (40) contains three share parameters: α, and ω, and γ¯ . In the baseline,
the share of observable costs in total educational expenditure is set at α = 0.5. Becker
(1964), Boskin (1975), and Trostel (1993) find that the share of goods invested in
education is about one-quarter and that the share of (tax deductible) foregone earnings
amounts to three-quarters. However, this ignores the effort cost of education (i.e.,
attending college, studying, etc.) and non-verifiable investment in on-the-job training.
The share of second-period consumption in total consumption, ω, is set at 0.5 and the
average ratio of non-labor income (net transfers and returns from initial wealth) to net
labor incomes, γ¯ , is 0.25. The exogenously given revenue requirement Λ balances
the budget.
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As regards the three relevant behavioral elasticities in (40) (i.e., σ , β , and ρ),
the largest empirical literature exists on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption σ . Whereas older papers found very small elasticities, more recent work
(e.g., Hall 1988; Attanasio and Weber 1995) suggests that the intertemporal substi-
tution elasticity is around σ = 0.5. Trostel (1993) contains an extensive discussion
on plausible parameter values for the returns to inputs invested in human capital β .
Trostel considers β = 0.6 the most reasonable value and the baseline employs this
number. Concerning the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the human cap-
ital formation ρ, we follow Trostel (1993) by using ρ = 1 as the benchmark value.
Hence, the production function of human capital is Cobb–Douglas.
In order to compute the optimal capital tax, we adopt a rate of return r on financial
investments featuring similar (risk) characteristics as investments in human capital.
Since human capital is riskier than government bonds, a real rate of return of 6% per
annum is assumed.15 In our two-period life-cycle model, each period captures one-
half of the average overall life span. Since we abstract from a retirement phase, we
adopt a cohort length of 25 years.16
Figure 1 shows the optimal capital income taxes at given labor income taxes for the
baseline values of the parameters. Quite surprisingly, a synthetic income tax, which
taxes capital and labor incomes at the same marginal rates, appears to be roughly
optimal. The case for substantially positive capital taxes also survives in our ‘conser-
vative’ simulation, where we assume that the human capital elasticity β is cut in half
to 0.3, the share of verifiable costs α increases to three-quarters, and the intertempo-
ral elasticity σ doubles in value to unity. At a marginal labor tax of 60%, the optimal
capital tax would still be around 20%.17
7 Conclusions
This paper investigated the interactions between labor markets, capital markets, and
human capital investments in a second-best world in which the government engages
in redistribution without being able to verify work and learning efforts. To that end,
we developed a two-period life-cycle model of human capital investment, financial
saving, and labor supply in which individuals feature different abilities to learn and
income inequality emerges endogenously. The reason why positive capital-income
taxes are optimal is that these taxes are a second-best instrument to alleviate the
labor-tax distortions on human capital accumulation. Accordingly, if a government
sets large marginal labor tax rates for redistributional reasons, it should also levy large
tax rates on capital income in order to combat the adverse impact of high marginal
15Estimated Mincer returns on education typically exceed 6%; see, e.g., Ashenfelter et al. (1999), Card
(1999), and Harmon et al. (2003). In analogy of the equity premium puzzle, this raises the so-called human
capital premium puzzle; see Judd (2000) and Palacios-Huerta (2006).
16See Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) for a three-period version of the model with a retirement phase. The
quantitative results are hardly affected.
17Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) perform more extensive sensitivity analyses. They find that the case for
substantial capital taxes is not lost—even for rather extreme parameter values that substantially deviate
from empirically estimated values.
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Fig. 1 Optimal capital income taxes
labor taxes on learning. We demonstrate that this applies to both linear and non-linear
policies.
The optimal marginal tax on capital income is large compared to the optimal mar-
ginal tax on labor income if, compared to the level of aggregate saving, the level and
composition of learning efforts are relatively elastic with respect to financial incen-
tives. Education subsidies reduce the need for capital taxes, but do not eliminate the
case for positive capital taxes as long as not all investments in human capital can be
verified. The optimal capital tax is zero only in knife-edge cases in which either all
investment in human capital can be verified or verifiable and non-verifiable inputs
cannot be substituted. All labor-tax distortions on human capital accumulation can
then be eliminated through education subsidies. Numerical simulations suggest that
optimal capital taxes are substantially positive. Our analysis thus suggests that the
welfare gains of replacing income taxes by consumption taxes are overestimated if
human capital formation is ignored. Indeed, consumption taxes are not neutral with
respect to human capital formation if not all investments in human capital are tax
deductible (see also Judd 1999).
This paper shows that policies to enhance human capital investment, private pen-
sion savings, labor supply, and income redistribution are fundamentally related over
the life-cycle and result in important trade-offs. Apart from the standard trade-off
between equity and efficiency, our analysis emphasizes a second fundamental trade-
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off between promoting human capital formation and stimulating financial savings.
This is important in light of the aging of the population and the Lisbon agenda. In-
deed, many European governments simultaneously want to stimulate human capital
investment, private pension savings, and labor-force participation while maintaining
income equality. This paper demonstrates that reconciling these objectives is a ma-
jor challenge. To illustrate, promoting (pension) savings by means of subsidies on
saving raises the opportunity returns on human capital investments, and thus induces
households to substitute financial saving for human capital investment.18 Further-
more, containing inequality by more progressive labor taxation distorts human capital
formation. In addition, more progressive labor taxes erode the tax base not only by re-
ducing hours worked, but also by promoting earlier retirement. Policy makers should
therefore take into account these life-cycle interactions between saving, working, and
learning.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix A: Compensated elasticities
To find the various compensated behavior elasticities with respect to policy vari-
ables, we log-linearize the model with two inputs around an initial equilibrium. The
complete derivation is provided in an Appendix downloadable from www.xs4all.nl/
~jacobs73. In particular, the linearized model is given by
c˜1n =
n
(1 − β + γn)
(
− (1 − αβ)
μn
t˜ + αβ
μn
s˜ −
(
1 − ω(1 − β)
μn
)
R˜
)
− σωR˜, (54)
c˜2n =
n
(1 − β + γn)
(
− (1 − αβ)
μn
t˜ + αβ
μn
s˜ −
(
1 − ω(1 − β)
μn
)
R˜
)
+ (1 − ω)σR˜, (55)
l˜n = −n(1 − αβ)
μn
t˜ + nαβ
μn
s˜ − n
(
1 − ω(1 − β)
μn
)
R˜, (56)
e˜n = − (1 + n − α)
μn
t˜ − (1 + (1 − ω)n)
μn
R˜ + α
μn
s˜, (57)
x˜n = − (1 + n − α)
μn
t˜ − (1 + (1 − ω)n)
μn
R˜ + α
μn
s˜ + (1 − α)ρ(t˜ + s˜), (58)
y˜n = − (1 + n − α)
μn
t˜ − (1 + (1 − ω)n)
μn
R˜ + α
μn
s˜ − αρ(t˜ + s˜), (59)
18This is reminiscent of Edlin (1993) and Feldstein (1995), who argue that (means-tested) subsidies on
education are implicit taxes on financial savings.
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a˜n =
(
(1 − ω)n + β(1 + n)
μn
)
t˜
+
(
(1 − ω)n(1 − ω(1 − β)) + β(1 + (1 − ω)n)
μn
)
R˜
+ ((1 − ω)(1 − β + γn)σω
)
R˜, (60)
where a tilde stands for a compensated relative change, e.g., e˜n ≡ den/en, ex-
cept for the tax rate and the subsidy rates where t˜ ≡ dt/(1 − t), s˜ ≡ ds/(1 − s),
and saving where a˜n ≡ Rdan/((1 − t)zn). n ≡ ∂l
∗
n
∂wn
wn
ln
, α ≡ xnψx/ψ , μn ≡ 1 −
β(1 + n) > 0, γn ≡ (Rao + g)((1 − t)zn)−1, σ ≡ d ln(c1n/c2n)/d ln(uc2/uc1), ρ ≡
d ln(xn/yn)/d ln(ψy/ψx). The elasticities of all variables with respect to the policy
variables are found by taking the coefficients of each policy variable in the linearized
equations: εqj ≡ ∂q˜
∂j˜
for q = en, xn, yn, c1n, c2n, ln, an, and j = t , R, s. In the first
part of the paper, all learning is non-verifiable. Hence, the elasticities of learning,
labor supply, first- and second-period consumption follow from setting α = 0 in the
linearized equations and dropping (58) and (59).
Appendix B: Optimal linear taxation
The Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare in the general model amounts to
max{g,t,R,s} L =
∫ n
n
Ψ
(
uˆ(g, t,R, s, n)
)
dF(n)
+ η
∫ n
n
[
t
(
nlnφ(en) − (1 − s)pxxn(1 + r)
)]
dF(n)
+ η
∫ n
n
[(
1 + r − R)(ao − c1n − (1 − t)(1 − s)pxxn − pyyn
)]
dF(n)
− η
∫ n
n
[
(1 + r)spxxn + g + Λ
]
dF(n). (61)
We define the tax wedges on xn and yn as Δx ≡ −(Rs + τr) and Δ ≡ tR/
(1− t)− τr , and define the net marginal social value of income (including the effects
on the tax base) as
bn ≡ Ψ
′λn
η
+ Δxpx ∂xn
∂g
+ Δpy ∂yn
∂g
+ tnφ(en)∂ln
∂g
− τr ∂c
1
n
∂g
. (62)
By substituting Roy’s lemma ∂υ(g, t,R, s, n)/∂g = λn, where λn denotes the private
marginal utility of income, and using the definition for b, we find from the first-order
condition for g
∫ n
n
bndF (n) = 1. (63)
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We find expressions for the optimal tax and subsidy policies by substituting
(i) Roy’s lemma (i.e., ∂uˆ(g, t,R, s, n)/∂t = −λn(zn − R(1 − s)pxxn), ∂uˆ(g, t,R,
s, n)/∂R = λnan, and ∂uˆ(g, t,R, s, n)/∂s = λnR(1 − t)pxxn), (ii) the Slutsky equa-
tions ( ∂q
∂t
≡ ∂q∗
∂t
− zn ∂q∂g , ∂q∂R ≡ ∂q
∗
∂R
+ an ∂q∂g , and ∂q∂s ≡ ∂q
∗
∂s
+ R(1 − t)pxxn ∂q∂g , where
q = xn, yn, ln, c1n, and the asterisk denotes a compensated change), (iii) the def-
inition of bn and the first-order condition for g (i.e., (62) and (63)), and (iv) the
proportionality factors between gross income zn and the tax and subsidy bases (i.e.,
xn = αβzn/((1 − s)pxR), yn = β(1 − α)(1 − t)zn/(pyR), Rc1n = (1 − ω)(1 − β +
γn)(1 − t)zn) in the first-order conditions for t , R and s:
∫ n
n
[
(1 − bn)zn + Δx
(1 − t)(1 − s)R
αβ
(1 − αβ)εxt zn +
Δ
R
β(1 − α)
(1 − αβ) εyt zn
]
dF(n)
+
∫ n
n
[
−
(
t
1 − t −
τr
R
(1 − ω)
)
n
μn
zn
]
dF(n) = 0, (64)
∫ n
n
[
(1 − bn)zn + Δx
(1 − t)(1 − s)R
αβ
(1 − ω(1 − β))εxRzn
]
dF(n)
+
∫ n
n
[
Δ
R
β(1 − α)
(1 − ω(1 − β))εyRzn −
(
t
1 − t −
τr
R
(1 − ω)
)
n
μn
zn
]
dF(n)
+
∫ n
n
[
τr
R
(1 − ω)σω (1 − β + γn)
(1 − ω(1 − β))zn
]
dF(n) = 0, (65)
∫ n
n
[
(bn − 1)zn + Δx
(1 − t)(1 − s)R εxszn +
Δ
R
β(1 − α)
αβ
εyszn
]
dF(n)
+
∫ n
n
[(
t
1 − t −
τr
R
(1 − ω)
)
n
μn
zn
]
dF(n) = 0. (66)
To find the optimal structure of education subsidies, add (64) to (66) to obtain
Δx
(1 − t)(1 − s)R
(
εxs + βα
(1 − αβ)εxt
)
= −Δ
R
(
(1 − α)
α
εys + β(1 − α)
(1 − αβ) εyt
)
. (67)
Use the relevant elasticities from Appendix A to find
Δx
(1 − t)(1 − s)R = −
Δ
R
(
(1 − α)(1 − ρ)
1 − (1 − α)(1 − ρ)
)
. (68)
By substituting Δx ≡ −(Rs + τr), we arrive at (38) in the main text.
To find (39), substitute (68) in (64) and (65) to eliminate Δx and substitute the
relevant elasticities from Appendix A:
ξ = Δϕβ
R
[
1 + n
μn
]
+
(
t
1 − t −
τr
R
(1 − ω)
)[
n
μn
]
, (69)
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ξ = Δϕβ
R
[
(1 + (1 − ω)n)
μn(1 − ω(1 − β))
]
+
(
t
1 − t −
τr
R
(1 − ω)
)[
n
μn
]
− τr
R
(1 − ω)σω (1 − β + γ¯ )
(1 − ω(1 − β)) , (70)
where ϕ ≡ (1 − (1 − α)(1 − ρ))−1(1 − α)ρ. Subtracting the latter expression from
the former, we arrive at (39).
Substituting Δ ≡ tR/(1− t)−τr into (39) to eliminate Δ, we find the dual income
tax in (40). The optimal labor tax in (41) follows from substituting Δ ≡ tR/(1 − t)−
τr into (69) to eliminate Δ and then eliminating τr/R by using (40). The total tax
wedge in (42) is derived by substituting (40) at the left-hand side of (42) to eliminate
(1 − ω)τr/R and then using (41) to eliminate t/(1 − t).
The corresponding expressions for the case without verifiable learning in Sect. 3
are found by setting α = 0.
Appendix C: Optimal non-linear taxation
The first-order conditions for the optimal control problem (49) are given by
∂H
∂ln
= η
(
nφ(en) + nlnφ′(en)den
dln
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
− dc
2
n
dln
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
)
f (n)
− θnu
n
(
1 − lnu
u
− lnuvvc1
u
pe
den
dln
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
+ lnuvvc2
u
dc2n
dln
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
)
= 0, (71)
∂H
∂an
= η
(
(1 + r) + lnnφ′(en) den
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
− dc
2
n
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
)
f (n)
− θnln
n
(
−uvvc1
(
1 + pe den
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
)
+ uvvc2
dc2n
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
)
= 0, (72)
∂H
∂un
= Ψ ′(.)f (n) − η dc
2
n
dun
∣∣∣∣
l¯,a
f (n) − θnln
n
uvvc2
dc2n
dun
∣∣∣∣
l¯,a
= dθn
dn
, (73)
where we employed den
dun
∣∣
l¯,a
= 0 by the envelope theorem.
To find the optimal capital tax, totally differentiate utility u(v(ao − an −
peen, c
2
n),1 − ln) at constant ln and un, and substitute the first-order condition for
consumption in (45) to find
(
1 + pe den
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
)
vc1
vc2
=
(
1 + pe den
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
)
Rn = dc
2
n
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
. (74)
Substitution of this result into (72) implies that the distribution term associated with
θn drops out. Substituting the first-order condition for learning (46) and simplifying,
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we arrive at
rT ′a(ran)
1 + (1 − T ′a(ran))r
= − T
′
z(zn)
1 − T ′z(zn)
βnεea, εea ≡ (1 − T
′
z)zn
Rnen
den
dan
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
, (75)
and βn ≡ φ′(en)en/φ(en).
To find the compensated elasticity εea, we use the marginal tax rates on labor and
capital income to steer the allocation such that labor supply is fixed and use these
changes in marginal tax rates to find εea = e˜n/a˜n (see also Bovenberg and Jacobs
2003). We have: l˜n = εlt t˜ + εlRR˜ = 0, e˜n = εet t˜ + εeRR˜, and a˜n = εat t˜ + εaRR˜.
This set of equations can be solved for e˜n/a˜n by using the first equation to eliminate
R˜ = −(εlt /εlR)t˜ and substituting this in the equations for e˜n and a˜n to find
εea = e˜n
a˜n
∣∣∣∣
l¯,u¯
= εet εlR − εeRεlt
εat εlR − εaRεlt . (76)
After substitution of the relevant compensated elasticities from Appendix A, we
obtain
εea = − 1
βn + (1 − ω)(1 − βn + γn)σ . (77)
Using this result in (75) to eliminate εea , we arrive at (51).
To find the optimal labor tax, totally differentiate utility u(v(ao − an − peen, c2n),
1 − ln) at constant an, and un, and find
dc2n
dln
∣
∣∣∣
a,u¯
= u
uvvc2
+ pe vc1
vc2
den
dln
∣
∣∣∣
a,u¯
. (78)
Substitute the first-order condition for consumption (45) and labor supply (44) to
eliminate u and vc1 , respectively,
dc2n
dln
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
= (1 − T ′z)nφ(.) + Rnpe
den
dln
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
= (1 − T ′z)
(
nφ(.) + lnnφ′(en)den
dln
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
)
,
(79)
where the second equality is found by substituting (46) to eliminate Rnpe. Substitute
(78) in the second line of (71) and the second equality in (79) in the first line of (71)
to eliminate dc
2
n
dln
∣∣
a,u¯
and use the first-order conditions labor supply (44) to eliminate
u = uvvc2(1 − T ′z)nφ(en) in the term θnu in (71) to arrive at
T ′z(zn)
1 − T ′z(zn)
= θnuc2/η
nf (n)
(1 − lnu
u
+ lnuv
uv
)
(1 + βnεel) , εel ≡
ln
en
den
dln
∣∣
∣∣
a,u¯
, (80)
where uc2 ≡ uvvc2 .
We proceed by deriving εel using similar steps as above. At constant levels of
saving (controlled by the first-order condition for an), we have l˜n = εlt t˜ + εlRR˜, e˜n =
εet t˜ + εeRR˜, and a˜n = εat t˜ + εaRR˜ = 0. The last equation implies R˜ = −(εat /εaR)t˜
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and substitution of this into the first two equations of the system yields
εel ≡ e˜n
l˜n
∣∣∣∣
a,u¯
= εet εaR − εeRεat
εlt εaR − εlRεat . (81)
Substitution of the relevant elasticities from Appendix A and simplifying gives
εel = − 1
n
(1 − ω)n − (1 + n)(1 − ω)(1 − βn + γn)σ
(1 − ω)(1 − βn + γn)σ + βn . (82)
Consequently, we find
1
1 + βnεel =
n
μn
(ω + (1 − ω)δn) nμn + δn
(1+n)βn
μn
,
δn ≡ (1 − ω)(1 − βn + γn)σ
βn + (1 − ω)(1 − βn + γn)σ , (83)
which after substitution into (80) yields (52).
The optimal level of redistribution follows from the first-order condition for un
(73). At constant levels of ln and an, we find dc
2
n
dun
∣∣
l¯,a
= (uvvc2)−1. Substitution this
into (73) yields
(
Ψ ′(.) − η
uc2
)
f (n) − θn lnuv
nuv
= dθn
dn
. (84)
Integration of this equation and using the transversality condition limn→n θn = 0
gives (53).
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